



With the modem tendency of enlarging the realm of admissibility
of evidence, most of the technical refinements of method and many
of the major historic obstructions will be eliminated. Indeed, it has
long been recognized by all scholars in the field as well as those en-
gaged in the every day practice before the courts that there is a need
for a re-examination of the rules of evidence with a view of simpli-
fication and of the elimination of historical oddities so as to bring the
law of evidence closer to reality in its truth finding function.' The
able work now being done by the American Law Institute in drafting
a model code of evidence for legislative adoption will go far in accom-
plishing these ends. Even now, through the multitude of exceptions
to various rules of exclusion, much new evidence is being admitted
which was formerly barred with almost a religious sanction.2  The
major emphasis of the future will undoubtedly be on the test of rele-
vancy to the issues accompanied by considerations of probative values
as to the quality of proof. The modem view is but an expression of
the basic approach of the great Thayer that all evidence logically rele-
vant is admissible unless in conflict with some specific rule of exclu-
sion." What occurred in the development of the law of evidence was
the shutting out by the courts from time to time of one thing or an-
other until the law of evidence became a study of a great mass of
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I. The names of Bentham, Thayer and Wigmore stand out as leading critics of
the strict law of evidence. In the twentieth century Wigmore in his treatise, now in its
third edition, has had a marked influence upon the courts in changing their attitude
toward reconsideration of evidence rules. At first, the courts were skeptical of the
changes advocated in his works, but they soon became the chief source of improvement
in the law. Morgan and Maguire, commenting on the work of Thayer and Wigmore,
stated, "It can definitely be said that in the last half century these two men, aided by
their admirers and imitators in law schools, on the bench and at the bar, have made a
lawsuit look appreciably more like a rational investigation of disputed questions of
fact." Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence (1937) 50
HAzv. L. REV. 909.
The attitude today is well expressed by Justice Sutherland in Funk v. United
States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (I933), in which he states, "The fundamental basis upon
which all rules of evidence rest-if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to
the successful development of the truth. And, since experience also is of all teachers
the most dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows that
a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should
yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly
demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule." See also Benson v. United
States, 146 U. S. 325 (1892).
2. See Ladd, Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence to
the Problem of Proof (1934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 5o6.
3. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 265.
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exclusionary rules. So extensive became the principles of exclusion
that a study of admissibility developed into almost an analysis of
exceptions to the exclusion. The current trend is to approach the
problem upon the original premise of Thayer which is to be accom-
plished through abandonment of unreasonable exclusionary rules.
Rather than creating fantastic exceptions to the exclusion of evidence,
modern rules should be designed to admit all proof which has a logical
relationship to the issues involved and to issues upon the truthfulness
of testimony given by witnesses. The pertinence of evidence to the
points in dispute and the testimonial reliability of witnesses are the
basic elements of any system of evidence designed to make available
the maximum opportunity for solving factual controversies. What
has been admitted in the past under an exception justified by fictitious
grounds or by astute rationalization should come in on its real basis
of simple usefulness in determining the factual dispute. Except where
policy may still justify privilege, establish incompetency or recognize
exclusion, the recent open door tendency in the law of evidence will
require greater attention to be given to relevancy, to the weight of
evidence, and to the credibility of witnesses. The accuracy and truth-
fulness of witnesses and the worth of testimony will continue to be
a problem of every trial tribunal on disputed facts no matter what
the future in broadening the admissibility of evidence may be. Thus,
along with the improvement of the law of evidence generally, the
problems pertaining to credibility of witnesses must also be adjusted
to present demands.
THE INTERRELATION OF PRINCIPLES OF EXAMINATION OF
WITNESSES TO CREDIBILITY TESTS
The credibility of witnesses in most instances is best determined
through the ordinary process of examination and cross-examination.
The specific character tests usually perform an auxiliary aid to dis-
cover the truthfulness of a witness. Character evidence standing
alone may be of but little value in determining truthfulness. It be-
comes significant only when accompanied by the simple devices em-
ployed in the examination of nearly every witness showing his oppor-
tunity to perceive facts and the consistency of his testimony as a
connected narrative. Indeed, the mendacious type of witness may give
truthful testimony and generally be given credit unless other elements
presented in a trial disclose a cause for the unreliable witness to falsify.
Thus general principles for examination of witnesses, not usually
thought of in connection with the tests of credibility, are important
in permitting the triers of fact to have ample opportunity to judge
I68 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the truthfulness of testimony. The direct examination of a witness
conducted so as to bring out his testimony as a continuous narrative
is a method which in itself assists in judging credibility. It should
undoubtedly be pursued much more than it is as a means of presenting
a clear story of the events and of giving strength to the testimony. A
witness, to be sure, must be guided by the questions of counsel because
many things which might appear significant to the witness may be
logically irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible. However, the effort of
counsel to ask questions which show only the nature of the intended
answer and of the witness to testify only to the question as asked has
been frequently carried to an extreme so that the witness becomes
frozen into rigid lines and has less opportunity to give a truthful ex-
pression of the facts as he knows them. The rule permitting a motion
to strike the testimony of a witness by the examining party because
it is unresponsive is helpful in that it prevents an unfriendly witness
from volunteering damaging and often inadmissible testimony against
the examiner. 4  A process of questioning the witness as a means of
bringing out testimony is necessary in order that opposing counsel
may object before answer to inadmissible testimony which if heard
by the triers of fact would cause prejudice.5 But too frequently a
simple narrative on the part of the witness is broken by unnecessary
questioning with a result of confusion of the witness and the jury in
its judgment of his testimony and its weight upon the issues. The
modern tendency is to encourage examination to bring out a continu-
ous narrative both as a means of supporting and testing credibility.
The form of questions permitted upon direct and cross-examina-
tion affords in a real sense a means of determining credibility. It
eliminates the suggestions to a friendly witness to be given through
questions and yet permits a true story to be well told. It is assumed
in our adversary system of trial that a party calls witnesses who he
believes will be favorable to his cause and in turn that the witness
will be unfavorable to the adversary. Thus the leading question rule is
simply a guide to obtain truthful testimony and to preclude the false.
6
4. People v. Carson, 341 Ill. IT, I73 N. E. 97 (193o); Buckley v. Frankel, 262
Mass. 13, 159 N. E. 459 (1928); Sorenson v. Smith, 65 Ore. 78, 129 Pac. 757, 131 Pac.
1022 (913).
5. Marinoni v. State, IS Ariz. 94, 136 Pac. 626 (913) ; Hanson v. City of Ana-
mosa, 177 Iowa lO, 158 N. W. 591 (19x6); Jacobs v. Cromwell, 216 Mass. 182, 1O3
N. E. 383 (913). See Ladd, Common. Mistakes in the Technique of Trial (1937) 22
IOWA L. REV. 609, 623.
6. Kirschman v. Pitt Pub. Co., 318 Pa. 570, 178 AtI. 828 (I935), ioo A. L. R. io62.
In the case of Steer v. Little, 44 N. H. 613 (1863), the various forms of leading ques-
tions are set out. Much discretion is allowed the trial judge in determining the pro-
priety of leading questions and in determining whether or not questions are leading.
Sullivan v. State, 200 Ind. 43, I6I N. E. 265 (1928) ; State v. Karri, 84 Mont. 13o, 276
Pac. 427 (1929) ; Nickell v. State, 205 Wis. 614, 238 N. W. 508 (1931) ; (1917) 65 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 303; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 387.
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The party calling a witness shall not frame questions suggesting the
desired answer upon significant points in dispute unless the witness
desires to avoid testifying about the matter or to give only testimony
injurious to the party calling him. For the same reason the form of
questions on cross-examination may be such as to suggest answers
unless the witness has disclosed his desire to help the cross-examining
party or to harm the adverse party. If these rules guiding the form
of questions are constantly thought of in their relationship to the prob-
lem of credibility, their administration becomes much simpler and pro-
vides a way to a correct decision upon the facts.
Closely associated to the form of questions which may be asked
a witness is the scope of cross-examination. If the court is alert in
observing the attitude of witnesses toward the parties in the trial as
disclosed by their conduct and other evidence indicating it, there should
be little difficulty in determining when leading or nonleading questions
should be asked whether in direct or cross-examination. If this be
true, then the dangers urged against a wide scope of cross-examination
concerning any material matter whether or not inquired about on direct
examination could be easily avoided. All courts now allow cross-exam-
ination to go into the whole subject of credibility of witnesses whether
the points were raised in the examination in chief or not.7  Other mat-
ters although not directly pertaining to credibility may be important
in judging the truth of the testimony given. Thus, the adoption of
the modern rule in permitting a wide scope of cross-examination upon
any material matter will not only expedite the trial by bringing out
the whole story as known by the witness but will also serve as a cred-
ibility test.8
More directly related to credibility are those common tests de-
rived from human experience as elements controlling the conduct of
people generally. Relevant matters of personal history including con-
duct, occupation, place of abode, environment and associations are tell-
ing factors in the perception of a witness which will produce accuracy
of testimony and also are among the most important considerations in
determining the tendency to falsify.9 The courts in the past have gen-
erally recognized the importance of this type of evidence in the exam-
7- In Stevens v. Beach, 12 Vt. 585, 587 (1840) the court states that "it is no doubt
competent for the party to put almost any question, upon cross-examination which he
may consider important to test the accuracy or veracity of the witness", and in the case
of Perkins v. Adams, 5 Metc. 44, 48 (Mass. 1842) the court says that "a witness may
always be subjected to a strict cross-examination, as a test of his accuracy, his under-
standing, his integrity, his biases, and his means of judging".
8. For careful discussion of the history and different rules applied on the scope of
cross-examination, see Note (1939) 24 IoWA L. REV. 564.
9. Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 (i931 ; Hollingsworth v. State, 53 Ark.
387, 14 S. W. 4i (i8go) ; People v. White, 251 Ill. 67, 95 N. E. 1036 (i91) ; Wilbur
v. Flood, i6 Mich. 40 (1867) ; Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140 (1859).
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ination of witnesses as to credibility, and in the future it will continue
to serve as a commonly used trial device. With the use of this type
of testimony modem rules of evidence should permit examination of
the witness concerning his earlier relevant statements at variance with
testimony given in court to impair credibility, whether called by the
party or not.'0 What in the past has been admitted by the courts under
the device of refreshing recollection by calling to the attention of a
party or witness his past inconsistent statements should be frankly
admitted for its impeachment value. If the witness admits making
the former statement, it serves to discredit his testimony although he
definitely stays by the testimony given in court which he may insist
is the correct statement. This is the practical effect and should be
given legal recognition. It is not extending the rule very far if at the
proper time in the course of trial the party who called the witness
would be given permission to prove the earlier inconsistent statement
if the witness denies making it. The rule denying a party the right
to impeach his own witness has been assailed by nearly every author-
ity, and the current trend in the law of evidence warrants complete
abolition of the rule. With twenty-two jurisdictions having removed
the rule by statute, the future of the law of evidence is bound to elim-
inate this obstruction to the discovery of truth.".
Many subjects of examination of a witness usually regarded as
necessary foundation testimony are as much related to credibility as
they are to the establishment of the qualifications of the witness. Basic
to the qualification of a witness to testify to any matter is his oppor-
tunity to know the facts whereof he speaks. The conception that the
function of a witness is to tell what he knows rather than what he
thinks or has heard others say is built upon the idea of credibility, and
out of this, at least indirectly, arises the hearsay and the opinion rule.12
Even the elimination of these rules of exclusion would not dispense
with the idea that the statement received in court must be founded upon
perceived knowledge of the witness dclaring the facts. Although
largely thought of in terms of admissibility, the foregoing principles
are essentially related to credibility. Thus for the purpose of impair-
ing or sustaining the credibility of a witness either party may examine
io. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Ozem Witness-New Developments (1936) 4 U.
oF CH. L. REv. 69.
ii. Ibid.; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 194o) § 905.
12. State v. Flanders, 38 N. H. 324 (1859). In 1621 Lord Coke, in Adams v.
Canon, i Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. P. 117 (1621), stated: ". . . it is not satisfactory
for the witness to say, that he thinks or persuadeth himself; and that for two reasons
by Coke: Ist, Because that the Judge is to give an absolute sentence, and therefore
ought to have more sure ground than thinking; 2dly, The witness cannot be prosecuted
for perjury; . .
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him in respect to his capacity for accurate perception, recollection and
communication. Also his opportunity and incentive for perceiving
matters stated in testimony as well as the likelihood of his remembering
what he has perceived are proper subjects of examination. Evidence
upon these matters performs the dual function of truth testing and of
showing the qualification of the witness to testify.
Inquiry as to motive, bias, interest, corruption, or his willingness
to be corrupted or to corrupt others in the pending litigation, as in the
past, will continue to be decisive factors in judging truthfulness of
testimony. Evidence showing a prejudicial attitude of a witness is
not only a test of credibility in itself but is an almost indispensible
foundation to make effective other evidence of a general propensity
to falsify. This type of evidence is intangible in its effect and yet
gives the clearest insight to an understanding or explanation of testi-
mony given in court. Obviously it should be just as available to a party
calling a witness as to the adversary, although not so considered by
some of the courts denying the right of a party to impeach his own
witness.' 3 These evidences of prejudice are helpful guides in discover-
ing the mistakes of the honest witness as well as showing the fabri-
cation of the falsifier.
CHARACTER AS A TEST OF VERACITY-METHODS OF PROOF
The character of an individual is important in the business world.
It is a significant factor in the extension of credit, the selection of
employees, the formation of various business associations, the deter-
mination of qualifications of those admitted to the professions and in
almost every relationship of social living. As intangible as the source
of the estimation of character may be, and although indefinite as a
basis of the prediction of future conduct, it is nevertheless commonly
relied upon in the affairs of every day life. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that the courts have made use of character testimony in crim-
inal trials upon the issue of probability or improbability that the accused
committed the crime charged against him, and in all cases as a test
of credibility of witnesses. While truth is true whether it comes from
a polluted or a pure source, when facts are in dispute the source of
the conflicting testimony may cast light in determining what the truth
is.' 4  In judging credibility the courts in the past have permitted use
13. Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pac. 817 (889) ; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla.
Cr. 362, io2 Pac. 57 (i929) ; cf. Stanley v. Sun Ins. Office, 126 Neb. 205, 252 N. W.
807 (1934) ; Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. io99 (1922).
14. Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Neb. 6o, 115 N. W. 323 (19o8) ; State v. Alverson, 214
N. C. 685, 200 S. E. 410 (1939), 12o A. L. R. 1441, 1443; State v. Wingard, 92 Wash.
219, '58 Pac. 725 (1916).
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of character evidence and in the future may be expected to use this
proof in appropriate cases. The means, however, of testing character
and applying it are in need of revision.
The courts are in conflict on the question as to whether in prov-
ing character the inquiry is limited to the witness's character for truth-
fulness, or whether his general moral character may be shown. While
the totality of the personality of an individual is undoubtedly signifi-
cant in predicting many types of things which he may be expected to
do, including the making of false statements, general qualities of char-
acter are regarded by the majority of courts as too broad to afford a
reliable credibility test.'" What is good and what is bad generally in
a person's make-up would depend in a large measure upon the environ-
ment and attitudes of the particular person judging character, whereas
all persons are responsive in singling out qualities related to truthful-
ness.', Consequently as a practical measure, it is believed desirable to
limit testimony upon the character of a witness to test his credibility
to the specific traits of honesty and veracity. The test as usually
applied has been to truth and veracity, but the broader expression of
honesty and veracity would seem to encompass more nearly the traits
of an individual which would show his regard for the truth or his
propensity to falsify when it would be to his advantage. Therefore,
the future of the law of evidence in its trend toward realism may be
expected to permit impeachment of a witness only by proof of his
character for honesty or veracity.
17
15. 3 WiGmoRE, EViDEN CE (3d ed. 194o) §§922-924; extensive note collecting au-
thorities (1934) 9o A. L. R. 870.
16. For excellent discussion of the problem of determining character see Carter
v. Cavenaugh, i Greene 171 (Iowa, 1848), holding only character for truth and verac-
ity was available for impeachment. The legislature of Iova later provided that general
moral character of a witness may be proved for the purpose of testing his credibility.
IOWA CODE (1939) § I127I. At first the court interpreted the statute to permit only
general moral character to impeach a witness, State v. Gregory, 148 Iowa 152, 126
N. W. iIO9 (191o), but later in the case of Hunt v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry., 16o
Iowa 722, 728, 14i N. W. 334, 337 (1913) the court, in an opinion by the same judge,
held that impeachment could be made by both character for truth and veracity and gen-
eral moral character.
17. In the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Payne, 2o5 Pa. iol, 54 At. 489
(19o3) proof of general reputation was excluded, even though it was coupled with
reputation for veracity. See Richardson v. State, 237 Ala. 11, 12, 186 So. 58o (1938) ;
Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477, 194 Pac. 939 (1921); Stock v. Dellapenna, 217 Mass.
503, IO5 N. E. 378 (1914); Mathey v. Flory Milling Co., 283 Pa. 331, 334, 129 Atl.
109, 110 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Williams, 2o9 Pa. 529, 58 Atl. 922 (i9o4). There
are some jurisdictions, however, where it is held that a witness cannot be im-
peached by showing his bad character for honesty and integrity. Ray v. Shemwell, 174
Ky. 54, 58, 191 S. W. 662, 665 (917) ; Calkins v. Ann Arbor R. R., 1I9 Mich. 312, 78
N. W. 129 (i899). These courts have failed to recognize the relationship between
general honesty and truthfulness. It is hard to see how the two may be segregated.
It would, furthermore, be much easier for character witnesses to testify as to honesty
and veracity because honesty and integrity may become generally known and recognized
as such, whereas experiences to judge only veracity may be more isolated. The test of
honesty and veracity to determine credibility is broad enough to provide a real test and
definitely excludes unrelated elements which- come under general moral character.
CREDIBILITY TESTS-CURRENT TRENDS
An equally vital problem concerns the method by which character
may be proved. Because of' the fear of founding character proof
upon some limited personal experience or prejudice and through a mis-
understanding of the earlier cases,' 8 the rule has developed in many
jurisdictions that when character is the subject of inquiry, the method
of proof must be by reputation alone. A substantial body of law has
been built up in defining what is meant by reputation and the extent
to which reputation must have expanded in order to be admissible.
In a pioneer period where communities were small, there was some
justification in requiring that the reputation be community wide or at
least that it not be limited to a specific group. With our modern
urban society and more scattered activities of people even in smaller
localities, the community-wide reputation as a requisite for proof of
character is difficult to secure. More consistent with conditions today
is the rule fast gaining recognition that reputation as a means of prov-
ing character should be sufficiently established if it exists among the
people with whom the person habitually associates in his work or
business or otherwise.
19
The distinction between reputation and character is sound, the
latter being what a party is in fact, the former being the composite
hearsay opinion of people generally in regard to what a person is or
what particular traits he possesses. When a trait of character has dem-
onstrated itself sufficiently through external manifestations so that per-
sons with whom an individual habitually associates speak of him gen-
erally concerning these traits, a reputation in respect to them is acquired.
This reputation becomes the means of proof of character.2 0
New developments in the law have not tended to exclude reputation
as a means of proof where character is involved but have tended to sup-
plement it by personal opinion of a character witness. This represents
the orthodox view in the opinion of Professor Wigmore 21 and is con-
sistent with the modern notion that the best evidence of a fact should
supplant the use of indirect fictions. If a witness testifies that another's
general reputation for honesty and veracity is bad, it undoubtedly
expresses his personal opinion as well. Most courts are willing to
admit in evidence a statement by the character witness that from his
knowledge of that reputation he would not believe the person in ques-
tion on oath.2 2  It is going but little further to permit the character
I8. Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony (i939) 24 IowA L. REv.
498, 509-518.
ig. Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937), 112 A. L. R. Z013, 1020.
20. State v. Poston, 199 Iowa 1073, 2o3 N. W. 257 (1925) ; State v. Baldanzo,
io6 N. J. L. 498, 148 Atl. 725 (1930), 67 A. L. R. 1207.
21. 3 WIGMORE EVIDENCE (3d ed. i94o) §§ 1981, 1982.
22. Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874); State v. Boswell, 13 N. C. 209
(1829); State v. Hooker, 99 Wash. 661, i7o Pac. 374 (1918). Contra: People v.
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witness to express his personal opinion directly based upon his percep-
tion of that person's behavior. In reshaping the rules of evidence for
the future, personal opinion as well as reputation ought to be available
as a means of proving character. Cross-examination of the character
witness would provide an equal safeguard against personal prejudice
under both methods of proof.
PREvIous CONVICTION OF A CRIME AS A TEST OF VERACITY
At the common law the conviction of a person for an infamous
crime rendered him thereafter incompetent as a witness. This doctrine
was established by the sixteenth century and persisted well into the
nineteenth century. It rested upon the theory that one who had engaged
in such reprehensible conduct was a person without honor and wholly
unworthy of belief. The incompetency also was regarded as a part of
the punishment.23 Blackstone in his commentaries states that "Infa-
mous persons are such as may be challenged as jurors, propter delictum,
and thereafter never shall be admitted to give evidence to inform the
jury, with whom they were too scandalous to associate." 24 This strict
rule of law included not only those crimes pertaining to dishonesty but
to all infamous crimes under the laws of England, generally enumerated
as treason, felony, and the crimen falsi.25 The reason, apparently unsur-
mountable at that time, was stated by Greenleaf that since "almost all
felonies were punishable with death, it was very natural that crimes,
deemed of so grave a character as to render the offender unworthy to
live, should be considered as rendering him unworthy of belief in a
court of justice." 26 In America likewise in the earlier period of our
history persons convicted of felonious crimes were held thereafter
incompetent to testify in court. Both in England 27 and in this country
the incompetency has been removed by statute, with but few exceptions,
but usually by the same act it is provided that the conviction of a crime
Lehner, 326 Ill. 216, 157 N. E. 211 (1927), but in this case the witnesses expressed
their opinion both from personal knowledge and from party's reputation. Supporting
opposition to the use of personal opinion, see (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 681. For an inter-
esting conflict within the same case, see State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 27o N. W.
874 (1937), and compare in the same volume of the reports, State v. Treager, 222 Iowa
391, 269 N. W. 348 (1936).
23. State v. Bezemer, 169 Wash. 559, 570, 14 P. (2d) 46o (1932) ; 3 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. i94o) §§ 5i, 986, 987.
24. 3 EL CoMM. *370.
25. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) §373; STARKIE, EVIDENCE (186o) 118;
SWIFT, EvmEcE (1810) 52.
26. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (i6th ed. i899) § 373.
27. The early English statute states that ". . . no person offered as a witness
shall hereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from giving
evidence, either in person or by deposition. . . .. 6 & 7 VICTORIA c. 85 (1843).
Later in I898 the statute was expanded to permit the accused in a criminal trial to
give testimony and protected him from an unfair use of former conviction. Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 VICrORIA c. 36. See Stone, The Rule of Excdusion of Sim-
ilar Fact Evidence: England (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 954.
CREDIBILITY TESTS-CURRENT TRENDS
shall thereafter be admissible as a test of the credibility of witnesses.2 8
The statutes widely vary in their provisions as to what crimes afford
the basis of testimonial impeachment; none of them being drafted upon
the basis of the specific relationship of the crime to the character of the
witness for truthfulness. 29 It is quite generally provided that convic-
tions of a felony may be so used. This limits the use of previous con-
victions to crimes serious enough to carry a penitentiary sentence '0 but
does not distinguish between the various grades of crimes carrying such
penalties, as for example operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
murder and perjury, all of which might provide a penitentiary sentence.
Conviction of a felony,31 crimes of infamous nature,32 crimes involving
moral turpitude,33 and crimes without further designation thus inclu-
sive of misdemeanors 34 are representative of the statutory provisions
permitting proof of a crime to be used to impeach the veracity of a
witness.
The theory of the use of previous convictions to test credibility is
well stated in the case of Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Company, in
which the plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries
received by him while in the defendant's employ. The plaintiff had
testified as a witness and the defendant put in evidence the record of his
conviction for impersonating a United States revenue officer several
years before the trial. The plaintiff then offered evidence of his char-
acter and present reputation for veracity, which was excluded. On
appeal, exceptions to the trial court's ruling were sustained, Justice
Holmes saying:
". .. when it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a
crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof
28. JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) § 716.
29. There are a few exceptions to the removal of incompetency in some states.
Conviction of perjury or subornation of perjury renders a person incompetent in Penn-
sylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, § 315.
The Tennessee statute is unusual in the crimes it lists rendering a witness incom-
petent. Some of the crimes have apparently no relationship to the truthfulness of the
witness but are in the nature of punishment. The crimes rendering the witness incom-
petent ("unless they have been restored to full citizenship") are: . . . abusing a
female child, arson and felonious burning, bigamy, burglary, felonious breaking and
entering a dwelling house, bribery, buggery, counterfeiting, or violating any of the
laws to suppress the same, forgery, incest, larceny, horse-stealing, perjury, robbery,
receiving stolen property, rape, sodomy, stealing bills of exchange or other valuable
papers, subornation of perjury, and destroying a will. . ." TENN. CODE (1938)
§ 11762.
30. See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422 (I885).
31. People v. Gray, 148 Cal. 5o7, 83 Pac. 707 (i9o6) ; Palmer v. Cedar Rapids &
M. Ry., 113 Iowa 442, 85 N. W. 756 (igoi).
32. Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 1i Atl. 861 (1920).
33. See Chandler, Attacking Credibility of Witnesses by Proof of Charge or Con-
viction of Crime (1932) IO TEx. L. REV. 257, an article which discusses the Texas
rule based upon moral turpitude involved in the crime.
34. Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, ilOT N. E. 989 (1913), 47 L. R. A. (N. s.)
215; Thompson v. Bankers Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 128 Minn. 474, 151 N. W. i8o
(1915) ; State v. Stone, 66 Wash. 625, 120 Pac. 76 (1912).
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affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction
may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone
that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular
case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no
tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has per-
jured himself and it reaches that conclusion solely through the
general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of
credit." 35
This statement by Justice Holmes pointedly presents the whole of the
theory upon which previous convictions are now admitted. The rea-
son for disbelieving the witness is his supposed readiness to lie inferred
from his general readiness to do evil which is predicated upon his
former conviction of a crime. It is not the specific tendency of the
witness to falsify but the general bad character of the witness as evi-
denced by the single act of which he was convicted that creates the basis
of admissibility. By the common law such a witness was not permitted
to testify at all because of this strong inference of unworthiness. Today
the theory is retained but its application is changed, permitting the con-
viction to brand the witness with the stigma of distrust, but still if the
jury, being conscious of his past, regards his testimony as true, it may
be given credit.
Common law incompetency created by the conviction of a crime
and the present day use of the record of a criminal conviction to test
credibility originate out of the same premise, that the doing of an act
designated by organized society as a crime is itself an indication of tes-
timonial unreliability. Is the premisein' its br6ad scope and application
a true basis for prediction of falsity? Does it harmonize with other
accepted principles of the law of evidence? Does it function in accord
with its intended purpose of assisting to secure just decision of cases?
In the first place an analysis of the use of previous convictions for
impeachment shows that the unreliability of a witness is predicted from
the commission of a single act. The conviction does no more than give
authoritative proof that the party did some particular act which is under
the law a crime. The accepted certainty of proof avoids the policy
objection to proof of collateral acts, which are held inadmissible.36
From the criminal act, with the stamp of a conviction as proof of its
commission, the victim is henceforth subjected to impeachment when-
ever he takes the witness stand. Most of the courts have placed no
limit upon the time after which a previous conviction cannot be used
35. 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
36. People v. Dean, 253 Mich. 434, 235 N. W. 211 (193i) ; see also the discussion
of this problem in Note (93) 29 MIcH. L. REV. 473. Knowledge of independent acts
may, however, be shown to impeach character witnesses but may not be independently
proved. See Ladd, note 18 mipra at 529.
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and permit remoteness to go only to the weight of testimony.37 Some
courts have refused to admit proof of prior convictions when regarded
so remote that they cannot reasonably bear upon the present character
of the witness. 38 It is significant that the use of this testimony is defi-
nitely not based upon service of a term in a jail or a penitentiary.3 9 If
such were the case there might be some basis of predicting future
untruthfulness as a result of prison environment and experience. This,
however, may be shown in some states.40 The mere fact of a convic-
tion, even if accompanied by a parole, is enough to place the stigma of
testimonial unreliability upon the convicted person.41 Pardon or com-
mutation of the sentence does not affect the use of this proof to dis-
credit a witness 42 but it may be shown by better authority to mitigate
its influence upon the jury.43 The criminal act solemnized by the con-
viction creates its own admissibility for discrediting the witness. This
is emphasized here in considering the value of this proof since there is
danger of being overwhelmed by the thought of the unworthiness of a
witness because of the conviction without considering that in reality
the distrust is being predicated only upon the doing of a single act.
Is the use of a previous conviction of a crime to test credibility
consistent with other legal theories of character evidence? One of the
principal reasons urged for the requirement of reputation rather than
opinion as proof of character is to prevent the party from being judged
by a single act or experience. It is only when the person's conduct
becomes so notorious because of a succession of acts drawing wide
public notice that proof of the character of the witness is admitted by
many courts. It is at once apparent that in admitting the previous con-
viction of a crime as a test of veracity the fundamental basis of admit-
ting other character testimony is disregarded and character as a fixed
quality is predicated upon a single act. The bare fact that the act is a
crime and that there has been a conviction makes the single experience
otherwise regarded unreliable and unsafe, a basis of future prediction
37. State v. Farmer, 84 Me. 436, 24 Ad. 985 (1892) ; State v. Bezemer, 169 Wash.
559, 14 P. (2d) 460 (1932).
38. Duncan v. State, 136 Tex. Cr. 18, 123 S. W. (2d) 344 (1938) ; Lott v. State,
123 Tex. Cr. 59I, 6o S. W. (2d) 223 (1933).
39. Kwong Nom v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
40. Smith v. State, 159 Ala. 68, 48 So. 668 (19o9) ; Smith v. State, 136 Tex. Cr.
53, 123 S. W. (2d) 655 (1939).
41. Herrin v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. 494, 262 S. W. 486 (1924).
42. Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; People v. Andrae,
295 Ill. 445, 129 N. E. 178 (1920) ; Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, IO N. E. 989
(1913), 47 L. R. A. (N. s.) 215.
43. People v. Hardwick, 204 Cal. 582, 269 Pac. 427 (1928), 59 A. L. R. 1480, 1489
(1929) 16 CAL. L. REv. 161, I So. CALIF. L. REV. 200; Commonwealth v. Quaranta,
295 Pa. 264, 145 Atl. 89 (1928), (1930) 34 Dlcl. L. Ray. 175. Contra: Gallagher v.
People, 211 Ill. 158, 71 N. E. 842 (19o4). Under the common law pardon removes the
incompetency. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450 (1891). For a discussion of the
subject, see Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 647.
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of the lack of veracity. Tested upon logical grounds it is difficult to
see how convictions-at-large of crimes-at-large satisfy the needs of rele-
vancy to the task which they are assigned to perform. The admission
of such proof to.test credibility in its broad application would find little
support upon psychological theories because as an isolated event it
would not be sufficiently representative to become the basis of establish-
ing a personality type.44 This is particularly true because the broad
scope of crimes included in the conviction test eliminates application of
any specification of human traits. A scientific method of determining
character could not proceed upon the deduction from one isolated act
without consideration of its details or of its nature other than the fact
that it was a crime under the existing social order. Even if all particu-
lars are known it is doubtful if many single acts would be adequate for
determining true character. The principle, if justifiable at all, must
rest upon the assumption that a person with a record of conviction was
not discovered, tried and convicted the first time he committed a crime,
but probably had been engaged in the commission of crimes for some
time before he was caught. Also some crimes frequently represent a
course of conduct as in the usual case of embezzlement. It often hap-
pens that an accused person is tried upon one criminal act which is
selected from many acts for the purpose of trial. In these situations
the particular conviction becomes representative of the witness in a
much larger way with a tenable basis for predicting his character as a
falsifier.
Although there is great danger in the use of previous convictions
to test credibility, this method of impeachment is so generally recog-
nized that it will probably be difficult to change in the future. It does
cause jurors to consider with caution the testimony of a witness whose
proven acts have been sufficiently serious to require prosecution by the
state. There should be, however, a rationalization of the kind of
crimes which may be used to test credibility. There is no justification
for the use of crimes in omnibus. Many crimes give no light upon the
credibility of the offender. Murder is both an infamous crime and a
felony and yet it may have no bearing upon veracity. Bentham dem-
onstrated the irrational use of this evidence in the illustration in which
he says:
"Take homicide in the way of duelling. Two men quarrel; one of
them calls the other a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation
of veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain to remain upon it, he
determines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and
kills him. Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference
between homicide by consent, by which no other human being is
44. See Ladd, note I8 mipra at 532.
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put in fear-and homicide in pursuit of a scheme of highway
robbery, of nocturnal housebreaking, by which every man who has
a life is put in fear of it,-has made the one and the other murder,
and consequently felony. The man prefers death to the imputa-
tion of a lie,-and the inference of the law is, that he cannot open
his mouth but lies will issue from it. Such are the inconsistencies
which are unavoidable in the application of any rule which takes
improbity for a ground of exclusion." 45
Infamous crimes and felonies indicate a marked departure from the
approved standard of social conduct such as will justify severe punish-
ment, but the departure may be in so many directions that its bearing
upon the truthfulness of the person committing them may be close in
point or very remote. For example, a felony is commonly defined by
statute as a crime for which the punishment may be a penitentiary sen-
tence. 46  A similar definition has been given to infamous crimes.
47
This is in no sense descriptive of the crime but only indicates its gen-
eral seriousness and for whatever reason it may be regarded as serious.
The term crimen falsi in most states has not been made the basis of dis-
crimination among felonies and infamous crimes to determine their
relevancy to truth-testing. Some states have permitted records of con-
victions of felonies in general, and misdemeanors in the nature of
crimen falsi, to impeach credibility, thus making the relationship of the
crime to the purpose of impeachment apply in misdemeanors but not
in the more serious crimes.48  The term crimen falsi has not been well
defined but may be said to include generally crimes injurious to the
administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud.
Perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery,
conspiracy to procure absence of witnesses, barratry, and forgery have
been included under crimen falsi.49  The relationship of -these crimes
45. 7 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (Bowrings' ed.) 4o7. Quoted
in 2 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (3d ed. i94O) § 519.
A Pennsylvania trial court expressed a similar thought in instructing the jury that:
"'If you believe them (the witnesses), you can waive their criminal records. . . . It
is a collateral matter to be determined by you.' . . . 'There has been a lot of unnec-
essary rattling of family skeletons, the purpose of which is to discredit their credibility.
They have openly and frankly admitted the crimes they have been accused of, the times
they were guilty, the times they have been sentenced, and the times they have served.
If they owed a debt to society they have paid (it) by their probationary period, or by
their prison sentences. It does not matter if they have been the blackest criminals in
the city, except as it affects their credibility, if you believe the testimony they gave on
the witness stand you will be justified in giving them as much credence as though they
were the whitest lilies ever painted'." This instruction was so strong that it was held
to constitute reversible error, but it shows a very good understanding of the problem.
Weiss v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., Ltd., 280 Pa. 325, 329, I24 Atl. 472, 473
(1924). See Note, 12o A. L. R. 1441, 1456.
46. Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, III Atl. 861 (192o).
47. Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348 (1886) ; Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass.
329, 349 (1857).
48. Commonwealth v. Schambers, 1IO Pa. Super. 6I, 167 Atl. 645 (1933).
49. Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 5oo, iii Atl. 861 (1920).
i8o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to veracity is self-evident. In the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth
v. Quarant, Justice Kephart said:
"But every offense of crime under the law is not relevant to prove
one's character for veracity, and, it is not permissible to show gen-
eral bad character because of the abuse that could be made of it by
the prosecution . . . the only crimes admissible to attack verac-
ity are such as affect credibility and refer to the conviction of a
felony or misdemeanor in the nature of crimen falsi." "
The classification of crimen falsi is too narrow and felonies too large
to meet the credibility test. Any classification of crimes on the basis of
their relationship to credibility is difficult. Personal crimes of murder,
assault, and mayhem, show a vicious disposition but not necessarily a
dishonest one. On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary, while
not showing a propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the
rights of others which might reasonably be expected to express itself
in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the
witness. If the witness had no compunctions against stealing another's
property or taking it away from him by physical threat or force, it is
hard to see why he would hesitate to obtain an advantage for himself or
friend in a trial by giving false testimony. Furthermore, such criminal
acts, although evidenced by a single conviction, may represent such a
marked breach from sanctioned conduct that it affords a reasonable
basis of future prediction upon credibility. It is quite possible that
with each other the robber class hold to some code of honor, but it is
unlikely that it would express itself in court proceedings if there were
a motive to falsify. The group of offenses including forgery, uttering
forged instruments, bribery, suppression of evidence, false pretenses,
cheating, embezzlement, roughly disclose a type of dishonesty and unre-
liability characteristic of those lacking veracity. Not only would wit-
nesses with such records tend to be conscience free in giving false tes-
timony, but these crimes, being of the enlarged crimen falsi class might
indicate the propensity to gain by false means and thus to falsify. Per-
jury has been regarded a sufficient indication of the probability of
future perjury that some legislatures in removing incompetency of the
common law retained it as to perjury. Whether perjury in one case
would be a stronger indication that the witness would perjure in another
than the commission of other crimes in the crimen falsi group is
questionable.
The class of sex crimes presents a difficult problem. It is hard to
associate honesty and truthfulness with general prostitution or disor-
derly house offenses. The associations and habit of living of those
50. 295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 AtI. 89, 92 (1928).
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engaged in such conduct places them in the class of those whose moral
sense has become so impaired that the obligation to speak the truth is
very lax. The subject of proof of other sex offenses of a female com-
plainant in a sex charge against a man has been extensively considered
by Professor Wigmore who is of the opinion that the entire sex history
of the complainant should be before the court. He regards it vitally
significant on the issue of veracity. 51 Whether all sex crimes are an
indication of a want of veracity is a disputed question, likewise is the
difference in sex offenses of men and women. 52  History contains the
names of many highly respected persons whose honor in telling the
truth would not be questioned and yet whose sex life would hardly be
the model for future generations. The frank novels and biographies
of the present day disclose habits of living, not commendable or in con-
formity with legal or ethical standards, and yet not representative of
people whose word under oath would be regarded bad. The patho-
logical cases and the problem of adolescent girls which Professor Wig-
more discusses would hardly afford adequate criteria for a broad
classification that sex offenses in general indicate untruthfulness. Con-
victions of sex offenses are now generally received. 53 Is their value
in truth-testing greater than the resulting prejudice? There may be
this distinction between the use of such convictions in cases involving
sex crimes and in other types of cases: they might have a vital bearing
upon truthfulness in cases involving sex offenses but have little or no
bearing in cases not in any way pertaining to sex matters, where the
use of such conviction appears doubtful.
The courts which have permitted evidence of the conviction of a
misdemeanor to test credibility have included another wide range of
crimes varying still more in their character than those included under
infamous crimes and felonies. It is here that the provision requiring
that the crime be one involving moral turpitude or crimen falsi is prin-
cipally important. It tends to segregate crimes purely mala prohibita
from those mala in se.54 In many jurisdictions this restriction is not
51. 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 924a.
52. State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 33 S. W. 167 (895).
53. Conviction of sex offenses come in under felonies or misdemeanors. A similar
dispute has arisen in the admission of evidence as character. In the recent case of
State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A. (2d) 705 (I939), the court held that questions
concerning sexual offenses and irregularities asked witnesses on cross-examinations
were properly excluded as not relevant for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a
witness. Also in Godfrey, et al. v. State, 187 Miss. 7o, z87 So. 199 (1939), the court
held that the veracity of a witness cannot be impeached by proof of unchastity. Contra:
Keesee v. May, 28o Ky. 583, 133 S. W. (2d) 920 (1939).
54. A crime inala in se is "defined as one which is naturally evil as adjudged by
the sense of the civilized community". A inala prohibita act, though, is one which is
wrong only because made so by statute. It does not involve "any moral dereliction which
carries with it a disregard of the obligation of an oath". Commonwealth v. Scham-
bers, no Pa. Super. 6i, 167 Atl. 645 (I933).
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made, and the mere fact that there is a conviction of a crime, whether a
misdemeanor or one of a more serious grade, constitutes the basis of
admissibility.55 The man who pleaded guilty for being drunk, the hus-
band who drives through a stop light, and the housewife who paid a
fine for overparking while shopping are all in this class. Obviously
such a classification is nonsense, but misdemeanors involving dishonesty
or false statement might conceivably be as significant for truth testing
as a felony.
Thus, the attitude toward previous convictions of a crime has gone
through a gradual development. In the first stage strict rules were
applied rendering one convicted of an infamous crime incompetent to
testify at all. This was followed by removal of the disqualification but
retaining the use of the conviction for impeachment. The next stage
points to a reappraisal of the rules in the light of their actual services.
Since the occasion to admit previous convictions of a crime is to test
the veracity of a witness, then only those crimes representative of qual-
ities which would tend to discredit the witness should be admitted for
that purpose. A fair classification would include those crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement committed at a time not unreasonably
remote. These crimes would be as easily determined as crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude. This classification is simpler than that under the
crimen falsi group and much more realistic. It would harmonize the
rule admitting convictions of a crime with the rule limiting evidence of
character for impeachment to traits of honesty and veracity. Whether
other crimes should be included such as those involving sex offenses is
a matter which should be scientifically determined upon some basis
other than an omnibus classification. In making a reclassification it is
believed preferable to place the limitation to include those crimes spe-
cifically relating to dishonesty and false statement rather than take in
the marginal cases.
Since the character of the criminal act rather than the length of
sentence is to be the basis of the test, misdemeanors as well as felonies
should be included. If such evidence is to have probative force, the
conviction should be recent enough so as to be an index of character.
In the case of reputation testimony to prove character, a reputation
55. Under statutes including misdemeanors, a violation of the liquor laws has
been admitted for impeachment. United States v. Wroblewski et at., 105 F. (2d) 444
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Commonwealth v. Ford, 146 Mass. 131, 15 N. E. 153 (1888) ;
Howard v. State, g4 P. (2d) 947 (Okla. 1939). Upon this subject there has been a
wide divergence of opinion. Palmer v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. Ry., 113 Iowa 442, 85
N. W. 756 (19O1) ; State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 Pac. 9o (1930). The disfavor
with which the liquor laws were received tended to mitigate the seriousness of their
violation. Judged in that light alone, the conviction of such crimes might not indicate
untrustworthiness. Yet, when considered in the light of the criminal associations and
activities which developed in that business, the conviction under the liquor laws might
indicate a most unreliable witness.
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remote in time is inadmissible and the same principle should apply to
crimes.56 The Texas statute places a fixed limitation of ten years dur-
ing which the conviction may be used to impeach. The time element,
however, might be related somewhat to the character of the crime com-
mitted. In the creating of a new rule it should be made clear that the
party calling a witness, as well as the adversary, should be able to use
a previous conviction for impeachment to impair credibility. 57  Thus,
for the future, a rule permitting any party to a law suit to impeach the
credibility of a witness by showing his conviction of a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement committed within a reasonable time prior
to the trial would constitute a real improvement upon the diverse classi-
fications now existing upon the subject.
The remaining question is whether or not the conviction of any
crime should render a witness incompetent to testify at all. The only
rational exception would conceivably be a conviction of perjury or
subornation of witnesses. The relationship between the commission of
the crime to truth testing is indeed immediate, and yet at most it would
indicate only a willingness upon the part of the witness to falsify under
oath. Clearly it does not mean that the witness will forever and under
all circumstances swear to false testimony. Psychologically, it is
doubted if such a person would falsify under less stimulation than a
witness who had committed other crimen falsi crimes. The safeguard
afforded by impeachment through a conviction of perjury would be so
strong as to make negligible the danger of misleading the triers of fact
by false testimony. If the testimony were true, and the circumstances
were such that it was believable in the face of such impeachment evi-
dence, the former conviction of the crime of perjury should not pre-
56. In State v. Dillman, 183 Iowa 1147, 1157, 168 N. W. 204, 207 (1gi8) Ladd, J.,
stated that "Even to cross-examination there should be some limit, beyond which the
veil should not be raised. . . . So much depends on the peculiar circumstances of
each case that no unvarying rule can be laid down; but it may be said that the cross-
examination can be extended back as far as inquiry of general reputation for truth and
veracity, or proof of general moral character; and there seems no tenable reason for
permitting cross-examination relating to specific acts to extend farther into the past,
unless these are in some way related to the facts or acts under consideration, and are
in some manner given significance thereby. This is a rule well calculated to allow suf-
ficient leeway to inquiry, and, at the same time, put a stop to opening up the past,
short of turning cross-examination into oppression and an attempt to harass or disgrace
the witness, rather than to test his credibility."
57. In Vause v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 346, 351 (1931) the witness for the gov-
ernment "was known to be a man who could and would indulge in trickery and fraudu-
lent financial schemes, and was an ex-convict because of his previous practices in that
regard. When (this witness) was put upon the stand to testify for the government,
the district attorney introduced him to the jury by questions and answers which brought
out his real character. His credibility as a witness was an important matter for the
jury to decide in order to get at the truth, and there is certainly no point in condemning
the district attorney for frankly disclosing at the outset what would enable the jury to
do its duty in that regard. The complaint now made rather savors of the thought that
he stole a march on these defendants in not letting that phase of the matter wait until
they could, if the saw fit, bring out the facts on cross-examination and make the most
of their apparent desire to put the witness in his proper place. . .
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dude its use in determining the truth in a testimonial conflict. The
testimony of a witness who had been convicted of the crime of perjury
might become very important in a case where he had no motive to
falsify, and the proof should not be lost.
CREDIBILITY TESTS AND THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS
Issues pertaining to the credibility of the accused as a witness cut
into the most fundamental principles of the trial of criminal cases.
They have a significant relationship to the constitutional inhibition
against compelling the accused to testify and the associated problem of
whether or not comment may be made by the prosecution upon his fail-
ure to do so. These issues materially relate to the theory that the char-
acter of the defendant in a criminal case shall not be assailed by the
state where he has not put it directly in issue. The application of the
approved means to test credibility invades upon the rule that other
crimes of an accused are inadmissible to prove him guilty of the offense
with which he is charged. The interrelation between the evidence used
to determine veracity and the basic conceptions of criminal justice make
these two problems component parts of the same issue and require a
greater appreciation of the way they function together if the ultimate
end of a fair trial with a just result is to be achieved.
The defendant in a criminal case occupies a dual position when he
takes the witness stand. As a witness the accused is subject to proof
of his former conviction of crime because of its indirect bearing upon
his likelihood to falsify; as a defendant the commission of other crimes
is expressly excluded because of the danger of influencing the jury to
believe that because of what he did in the past it is probable that he did
the act charged against him in the trial. A defendant in deciding
whether he will take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf
must take into account not only the question of his innocence and the
proof by which he may establish it but also the dangers to which he is
exposed by the evidence which the prosecution will present at least
ostensibly to discredit his testimony.
The problem most pointedly appears in those states in which a
bad general moral character is admissible to impeach the veracity of the
accused as a witness. In the recent case of State v. Williams 58 the
Missouri court remedied this situation which had long troubled that
court and consumed many pages of lengthy opinions. A statute of
this type 59 was in effect and although it has not had smooth sailing in
58. 337 Mo. 884, 87 S. W. (2d) 175 (1935), ioo A. L. R. 1503.
59. I Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3692.
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Missouri, it was consistently followed in the case of State v. Scott.6 °
Judge Ellison delivered an opinion vigorously protesting against the
rule but ultimately conceding its application on the theory that any wit-
ness as mentioned in the statute included the accused as a witness. In
the Scott case, the accused was tried for the commission of a robbery
alleged to have been committed at six o'clock in the evening, and the
state's evidence pointed to him as one of four men who had engaged in
the offense. The defendant took the witness stand and testified that he
was at home eating dinner some thirty miles away at this time. This
was confirmed by evidence of members of his family. The defendant
did not raise the issue of his good character to show improbability but
depended upon his own testimony and that of others upon facts which,
if true, established an alibi. The state, however, introduced character
testimony showing that the defendant's general moral character was
bad, ostensibly to impeach his credibility, and the court in its instruc-
tion advised the jury as to the purpose of this evidence informing them
not to regard it as an indication of the probability that he had com-
mitted the offense. The character of the accused was paraded before
the jury as much as if the accused had expressly put his character in
issue, the only limitation being the use of this evidence as explained in
the instruction. The case was tried three times; twice the jury failed
to agree, and on the third trial convicted the accused and assessed the
punishment for the comparatively light term of two years considering
the gravity of the offense. How much the evidence admitted showing
the bad moral character of the defendant had to do with the verdict
cannot be accurately ascertained. The facts were close and the verdict
may indicate that the jury thought the defendant was a bad man and
ought to be put away for awhile but that in view of their doubt upon
the evidence they hesitated in giving him the maximum" punishment
which he deserved if guilty. It is, indeed, doubtful, in view of the
result, that the jury segregated the bad character evidence and used it
only to test veracity. A reasonable speculation is that the evidence of
bad moral character permitted acceptance of the propensity of the
accused to commit the crime as well as to falsify. It is significant,
therefore, that when Judge Ellison was again faced with the same prob-
lem in the Williams case he overruled the Scott case and held even in
face of the Missouri statute that impeachment by proof of bad general
moral character should no longer be permitted.
In other jurisdictions in which evidence of bad moral character is
admitted for impeachment purposes the same rule is applied when the
accused takes the witness stand in his own behalf. There have been
6o. 332 Mo. 255, 58 S. W. (2d) 275 (1933), go A. L. R. 86o.
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express holdings sustaining this view in Alabama, 6 ' Arkansas,
6 2
Indiana,63 Iowa,64 Kentucky,65 Louisiana, 66 North Carolina, 67 Ore-
gon,68 and Tennessee. 69  The chief objection to this evidence is that
for all practical purposes it very definitely puts character in issue with-
out consent of the accused thereby violating what upon general grounds
of policy is regarded as a sound rule. This doctrine is founded simply
upon the desire to avoid unfair prejudice and unjust condemnation
which such evidence might induce in the minds of the jury.70 When
proof of bad character is admitted there is the real danger that the
defendant may be overwhelmed with prejudice instead of being tried
upon evidence produced to prove his guilt of the specific offense with
which he is charged. Moral character in general fills a big gap in the
trial with the jury. Although general in its terms it may be taken to
go to the very trait involved in the crime charged whatever it is irre-
spective of what the background of the moral character evidence may
be. It helps the jury to be satisfied with much less proof than they
otherwise would demand for conviction. It may be the turning point of
the case to the untrained mind. It is easy to grasp and gives confidence
in conviction. Even to those among the jury who carefully discriminate
and endeavor to make proper uses of the evidence as the court charges,
evidence of bad character of the accused makes them less critical in
their effort to be sure that they have rightly convicted, finding solace
from the possibility of error in the fact that after all the defendant is a
bad man.
Aside from other reasons which would deny the use of general
character as evidence of credibility of a witness, as a practical matter
it should be excluded if applied to the accused as a witness because
61. Riggan v. State, 21 Ala. App. 482, 1O9 So. 888 (1926); cert. denied, 215 Ala.
107, iog So. 889 (1926).
62. Herren v. State, I69 Ark. 636, 276 S. W. 365 (1925).
63. Foreman v. State, 203 Ind. 324, iSo N. E. 291 (1932).
64. State v. Hart, 2o5 Iowa 1374, 219 N. W. 405 (1928).
65. Shell v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 223, 53 S. W. (2d) 524 (1932).
66. State v. Guy, io6 La. 8, 30 So. 268 (igoi).
67. State v. Efler, 85 N. C. 585 (i88i).
68. State v. O'Donnell, 77 Ore. 1i6, 149 Pac. 536 (1915).
69. Peck v. State, 86 Tenn. 259, 6 S. W. 389 (i888).
70. Professor Wigmore speaks of the reason of excluding evidence of moral char-
acter when offered by the prosecution in the first instance as based upon the auxiliary
policy to avoid uncontrolled prejudice and possible unjust condemnation. In comment-
ing upon this policy he says, "This policy of the Anglo-American law is more or less
due to the inborn sporting instinct of Anglo-Normandom-the instinct of giving the
game fair play even at the expense of efficiency of procedure. This instinct asserts
itself in other departments of our trial-law to much less advantage. But, as a pure
question of policy, the doctrine is and can be supported as one better calculated than
the opposite to lead to just verdicts. The deep tendency of human nature to punish,
not because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well
be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with
any jury, in or out of Court. . . . The rule, then firmly and universally established
in policy and tradition, is that the prosecution may not initially attack the defendant's
character." x WiGmoRE, EVmIENcE (3d ed. I94O) § 57.
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it does not fit into the basic principles guiding the trial of criminal
cases. Under the guise of impeachment this rule permits the presen-
tation of evidence which is in conflict with the fundamental concep-
tions of criminal justice. The limitation of character testimony to the
specific trait of honesty and veracity not only strengthens the evidence
for its intended use but, at least in many cases, would avoid abuse
where the accused is a witness. Even this does not go the whole way
in correcting the misuse of such evidence because in the cases in which
the crime charged relates to dishonesty or perjury, use of those traits
to impeach the accused would repeat the danger. The problem of
the accused as a witness shows the impracticability of using general
moral character for impeachment generally and affords a strong argu-
ment to abolish it altogether in accord with modem developments, as
has been done by the Williana case in Missouri.
Whereas the use of moral character as a credibility test by the
state against the accused is allowed in only a minority of jurisdic-
tions, the right of the state to prove convictions of a crime is almost
universally admitted as a test of veracity. 71 Our present problem is to
see its effect upon the accused who offers himself as a witness in a
criminal case. The same principles operate here which have just been
considered in respect to moral character, only with greater force. The
admission of this testimony also comes into direct conflict with the
theory of exclusion of proof of similar offenses. Whether the value
to discredit outweighs the possibility of misuse by the jury in render-
ing a verdict has not been dealt with a great deal by the courts since
the right of admission is usually decided on the basis of the interpre-
tation of a statute upon the subject. Three possible effects from the
introduction of the previous conviction of the accused who offers him-
self as a witness should be kept in mind in examining the cases: (i)
The previous conviction may be taken for its intended purpose only,
i. e., to test his credibility. (2) It may be used to show the propensity
of the accused to commit the particular act charged. This is partic-
ularly true when the prior conviction was the same as the present
charge and its nature is stated. (3) Proof of the former conviction
may create a general prejudice against the accused causing the jurors
to regard him as a bad individual and to consider it generally desirable
that he be put away quite apart from whether the present proof of his
guilt is sufficient under the law.
The Iowa cases illustrate the problem of these different ways by
which the proof of a conviction of a crime may be used by the jury
and the recognition of the danger by the court. In the case of State
71. 3 id. §§ 98, 987.
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v. Concord 72 the defendant was on trial for the crime of burglary
and offered himself as a witness in his own behalf. When cross-
examined by the state he was asked if he had been convicted of the
crime of burglary before. The questioning of the prosecutor as re-
ported in the opinion is here set out to show the einphasis placed upon
the specific felony.
Question. "Have you ever been convicted of a felony ?"
Answer. "I pleaded guilty to a felony."
Question. "What was the charge against you?"
Objected to as immaterial. Objection sustained and excep-
tions.
Question. "You pleaded guilty and were convicted of burglary,
were you not?"
Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
Objection overruled and exception.
Answer. "I was convicted of a felony."
Question. "Will the reporter read the question?"
The reporter read the question.
Answer. "Yes, sir."
The court looked upon the examination as not being designed for im-
peachment but rather to show that the defendant had been convicted
of the same offense for which he was being tried and reversed the
case. This is one of the relatively few cases which has made this dis-
tinction, most courts permitting indiscriminately the right of state's
counsel to interrogate upon or prove by record the specific crime. In
the opinion the court said:
"The defendant being a witness on his own behalf, it was com-
petent to show, as affecting his credibility, that he had previously
been convicted of a felony. CODE § 4613 . . .The same statute
provides that no other proof is competent except the record thereof.
We held, in State v. Carter,73 that practically similar inquiries of
a witness were proper. The writer is disposed to think that, as
applied to such facts as are here shown, the rule should not be
adopted. Counsel, in propounding the question, was evidently
not intending to use the answer for impeaching purposes, but to
show that he (defendant) had theretofore been convicted of a
like offense. It was not admissible for that purpose, and the ma-
jority of the court as now constituted are of the opinion that, as
this was the manifest purpose of the inquiry, it was error to press
the question to an answer. . . . Of course, he (the accused)
is subject to impeachment as any other witness; but the state,
in conducting the cross-examination, should be confined strictly
72. 172 Iowa 467, 154 N. W. 763 (1915).
73. 121 Iowa 135, 96 N. W. 710 (1903).
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to matters of impeachment and not, under cover thereof, be per-
mitted to inject prejudicial matter." 74
Other Iowa cases have approved the Concord case but have ad-
mitted proof of a specific felony if it was not of the same type as
the crime for which the defendant was being tried.75 The court
while recognizing the danger of using this method of impeachment in
showing similar offenses has not generally been concerned with what
may be more serious, namely permitting specific felonies to be shown
which may create passion and prejudice against the accused and even
more forcibly influence the jury. In the case of State v. Friend U in
which the defendant was being tried for receiving stolen property, the
prosecutor on cross-examination propounded the question whether or
not he had been previously convicted of the crime of rape. The court
contented itself in affirming the decision upon the ground that there
was no error in admitting this proof to discredit the defendant as it
did not involve the same crime for which he was being tried. Obvi-
ously the conviction of the crime of rape would create a hostile atti-
tude toward the accused and develop a feeling of willingness to con-
vict him if they could.
The effect of showing a previous conviction of crime is so strong
in either creating prejudice in the minds of the jury or causing them
them to believe that the accused has a propensity to do evil that the
desirability of the use of this type of evidence for impeachment pur-
poses when the accused is a witness is very doubtful. Commenting
upon the effect of proof of former conviction of the accused, Justice
Willis in the California case of State v. Graiillo said:
"It is a matter of common experience and knowledge that once
the average juror learns that the defendant has previously been
convicted of a crime of the same class as that for which he is
being tried, that juror will consciously or unconsciously consider
and allocate to a type or class the man on trial, as distinguished
from the admeasuring of his credibility as the witness on the
stand; and this despite all instructions by the court, for the court
may not, except by virtue of presumption, control the ordinary
process of the human mind and its natural gravitation toward the
ordinary and usual inferences or implications which flow from
knowledge of an established fact." 77
74. State v. Concord, 172 Iowa 467, 475, I54 N. W. 763, 765 (1915).
75. In the case of State v. Williams, 197 Iowa 813, 819, 197 N. W. 991, 994 (1924),
the court approved questions of the prosecution pointing out and identifying the char-
acter of previous felonies, saying, "The offenses inquired about were not similar to the
one for which the defendant was then being tried, and the case does not come within
the rule laid down in State v. Concord . . . where there was a manifest effort to
show, under the guise of impeachment, that the defendant had been convicted of a like
offense."
76. 210 Iowa 980, 230 N. W. 425 (1930).
77. 140 Cal. App. 707, 718, 36 P. (2d) 2o6, 211 (1934).
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The accused was being tried for murder and the prosecuting attorney
had made some prejudicial remarks, claiming that he was a killer,
which would justify a new trial. The court, however, refused to re-
verse and held that the error was without prejudice because, through
legal channels, evidence of a previous conviction had been admitted
and in the natural course the jury would draw the same conclusions
as were reflected by the district attorney's statement. The conclusion
of the court was that the prejudice instilled in the minds of the jury
by the state's remarks was non-consequential because the prejudice
already had been created when the accused admitted that he was an
ex-convict. After the jury had this knowledge the court regarded
the accused as good as convicted in advance regardless of his actual
guilt. If this is true, it means that the impeachment process is being
made a false condition for the admission of evidence of the most
damaging sort and constitutes a practical repudiation of what are re-
garded as fundamental principles of fair trial. It was this error that
the Concord case sought to avoid by denying proof that the accused
had been convicted previously of the same crime for which he was
being tried. A partial solution would be to eliminate proof of crimes
to discredit a witness which have no relationship to dishonesty or false
statement. But even this may be insufficient where the accused takes
the stand as a witness. A previous conviction plays such a vital part
in influencing the jury against the accused that some further safe-
guards may be necessary to secure just decisions in criminal trials.
The courts fully recognize the danger and have regarded it sufficiently
serious to reverse any cause where the other offense does not come
into the case upon the bypath of some orthodox excuse for its admis-
sion.78  But the bypath of previous convictions for the purpose of
testing credibility is something never missed by the prosecuting attor-
ney. The more carefully the defense attorney and the court warn
the jury that its purpose is only to test credibility, the more empha-
sized the fact becomes that the jury has before them one who has
been convicted of crime before, that he is up for trial again, and that
it is perhaps time that something should be done about it. The ac-
cused becomes classified by the jury as a person of moral depravity
with the consequent disregard for what may happen to him. The
feeling is developed that if the accused did the acts for which he was
formerly convicted, he would have no moral scruples against com-
mitting the crime with which he is now charged. The jury feel less
78. People v. Adams, 76 Cal. App. 178, 244 Pac. lo6 (1926) ; State v. Shields, 195
Iowa 136o, 192 N. W. 521 (923) ; Commonwealth v. Vandenhecke, 248 Mass. 403, 143
N. E. 337 (1924) ; Stock v. Dellapenna, 217 Mass. 5o3, io5 N. E. 378 (914) ; Daggett
v. State, 114 Neb. 238, 2o6 N. W. 735 (925).
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of the urge to be right in their verdict because they believe they have
a bad subject before them and that the consequences of their mistake
cannot be so serious.
The whole problem is closely related to the constitutional priv-
ilege of the accused not to testify and with the associated problem of
the right of the state's attorney to comment upon his failure to do so."
Undoubtedly one of the principal reasons the accused with a prior
conviction fails to testify is that he fears even with an honest defense
that the knowledge of his former conviction will make certain a ver-
dict of guilty in spite of whatever he has to say. This calls into ques-
tion a balancing of values. Does it mean more to have the accused
testify than it does to keep him from the witness stand because of a
fear of prejudicial cross-examination? If, in accord with modem de-
velopments, comment is to be permitted upon the accused's failure to
testify thereby increasing the pressure to cause him to take the wit-
ness stand, should the law be revised so as to permit him to tell his
side of the story without being subjected to diverse collateral matters
not immediately related to the case and which blacken into insignifi-
cance even a story of the truth which might be told? In considering
the future of the law of evidence upon this point, the solution may be
that the previous conviction of a crime involving untruthfulness should
be permitted to impeach witnesses generally except that it should be
inadmissible against the accused in a criminal case when he takes the
stand. While it may be reasonably questioned whether so great a
step should be taken, there can be no doubt that restricting admissi-
bility of convictions for testing credibility to those involving dishon-
esty and false statements will prevent at least many of the present
abuses.
79. The right of state's attorney to comment upon the accused's failure to testify
has in recent years been regarded as of great significance. The rule prohibiting such
comment having been regarded in some states through judicial interpretation as a con-
stitutional guarantee has required constitutional amendment for change. California sub-
mitted the amendment to popular vote and obtained its adoption. CoNsrruTIoNAL.
AMENDMENT TO A2i'. I, § 13 (1934). In the same manner the right to comment be-
came a part of the Ohio constitution. CONSTiTUTiOAL AmENDmENT TO ART. I, § i0
(i9m). For collection of authorities see Note (1928) 37 YA=E L. J. 955 and (193o)
68 A. L. R. 11o2. For excellent discussions on both sides of the problems see Bruce,
The Right to Comment on the Failure of Defendant to Testify (1932) 31 MIcH. L.
REv. 226; Reeder, Comment upon Failure of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 MICI.
L. R v. 4o. The right of the comment has been strongly favored by 8 WIGmORE EVI-
DENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2272, 2272a. The literature in legal periodicals is abundant on
the subject. A factor often lost sight of is the relationship of the right to comment to
the credibility tests imposed upon the accused. As important as the comment may be
in securing fair trial from the standpoint of the state, in turn it should be considered in
the light of a fair trial of the case as a whole so as to eliminate some of the credibility
tests used primarily in practice to create prejudice rather than serve their intended
function.
